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Executive Registry

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26 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Worldwide Briefing - Senate Armed Services Committee

In the worldwide briefing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Cohen expressed concern about the stability of the Philippines and the risk it might pose to Clark Field and Subic Base. Upon being somewhat reassured that the Philippines is not about to go up in smoke he said that that's what they had heard about Iran. That set me thinking that we should see if we can develop an analysis about what I would call the machinery of takeover in Iran [redacted], in the Philippines and maybe two or three other countries of critical strategic significance.

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In Iran it was a machinery represented by the Mullahs, their followers and the mobs in the streets. It was also a sad financial independence which Iran had. [redacted] the Philippines do not have the same financial independence. That may or may not be important. They don't appear to have a built in nationwide machinery comparable to that of the Mullahs in Iran. Is there any substantive machinery, i.e. the Army, as in Nigeria, or labor unions or leftist organizations or mobs and how might they materialize in those countries? Also, what is their complexion likely to be in terms of maintaining or protecting our strategic interests as with respect to Clark Field and Subic Base.

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William J. Casey



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What is the available schedule for these estimates in classified and unclassified form? As soon as Bob Gates gets his new concept for presentation of force structure and spending estimates together, we should schedule a game plan with Defense, NSC, the Defense Committee, as well as the Intelligence Committees on the whole subject.

5. Tower asked for an update briefing on Soviet laser development and missile defense development.

6. Tower asked for data on Israeli losses in Lebanon at the time of the initial incursion.

7. Tower asked what a study tells us on the implications of the KAL shootdown for Soviet air defense and command and control.



William J. Casey

cc: SA/DCI/IA

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